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Contra Sullivan on the Surge: A Small Wars Perspective

My take on the Iraq war has been settled for a while: The decision to invade was a huge mistake, but cutting and running would only make things worse. So I’ve been mildly encouraged by the growing evidence of success by the surge and the accompanying political efforts. Here’s Andrew Sullivan’s take or, more precisely, the more cheerful parts of AS’ take:

… the passage of the law allowing for more Sunnis and former Baathists to take part in the national government’s structure is new. It’s a genuine success of the kind we were once promised. It’s the first actual data point that suggests some kind of reconciliation may be possible in Baghdad. ... if there is any indication of national reconciliation, even if it is fleeting and ephemeral and qualified, the argument for sinking more money and time into Iraq will, it seems to me, gain strength.

But then Sullivan makes this rhetorical move:

Since the failure of nerve by the opposition last summer, the US has effectively decided to occupy Iraq for the rest of our lives. We had a choice: ten months or ten years, and by default we picked the latter - and, according to McCain, it’s more like a hundred years. ... Iraq, I suspect, is now America’s for ever - something Iraqis will always resent but never be able to reverse.

This strikes me as unduly pessimistic. What we’re dealing with here is a war of the type the US has often fought:

Unlike its predecessor, it is not a traditional war and is the type of war the US military tried to avoid for years—a counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgencies fall into the category of “small wars,” which also includes peacekeeping, stability and support operations, and humanitarian missions. Also referred to as low-intensity conflict, guerrilla war, irregular war, and “savage wars of peace,” among other names, the term “small war” does not imply the size or intensity of the conflict. Small wars are instead characterized by the asymmetric nature of the conflict, and the political outcome sought, and they typically pit a state against a non-state adversary who does not employ regular forces. Irregular enemies range from terrorist organizations, criminal groups, and militias to warlord armies and insurgent movements. The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual defines small wars as “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as determined by the policy of our nation.” Victory—or more accurately, success—in this type of war is much more difficult to determine. Instead of a clearly defined end-state where one side capitulates, success in these irregular conflicts is measured by the political outcome that results from the intervention.

Small wars are not new to the American military. Yet despite the nation’s long history in this arena, the American success rate in waging small wars is far from stellar, particularly since the end of World War II. Thomas X. Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone, notes “the only kind of war America has lost” is a small war against an irregular foe, citing Vietnam (1975), Lebanon (1983), and Somalia (1993) to support his point.

Yet, it’s precisely that patter of losses I believe we cannot afford to repeat in Iraq:

As an Army brat growing up during the Vietnam War, I saw the damage our strategy of just declaring victory and going home did to Army morale and prestige, to the tone of our national politics and our nation’s standing in the world. Later, we cut and ran from Lebanon. More recently, we cut and ran from Somalia. I have no doubt that this pattern of cutting and running emboldened al-Qaida. We simply cannot afford to cut and run from Iraq, lest our foes be emboldened to new and even more devastating attacks. A global hegemon that keeps running away when the going gets tough will not command any respect.

In sum, even if attacking Iraq was imprudent, we have to stay the course. There could be nothing less prudent than cutting and running. Our permanent national interests now require that we win the peace.

...

Americans know that we’ve fought many wars in which there were times when it looked like we might lose. In most, we stayed the course and eventually came out on top. Only when we cut and ran did we lose.

The good news is that small wars don’t last forever and can be won. To be sure, there have been small wars that resulted in long occupations; The Phillipines and Nicauragua spring to mind. Yet, even so, American policy long has been - as the Marine Corps’ 1940 small wars manual puts it - “small wars will not be conducted with a view to the permanent acquisition of foreign territory.” To the contrary, “eventual withdrawl is certain.”

Sullivan can point to quotations from some politicians to support his argument, but the historical evidence is to the contrary. Where is the evidence that the powerful underlying social, economic, and cultural factors that have defined America’s approach to small wars for two centuries have changed so fundamentally?