The California Supreme Court decided today that same-sex couples should be permitted to wed, ruling that gay unions must be given the “respect and dignity” of marriage.
In a 4-3 vote, the court became the first in the country to apply the constitutional protections reserved for race and gender to sexual orientation. The Massachusetts high court struck down bans on same-sex marriage in 2003, but under a different legal theory. ... “One of the core elements embodied in the state constitutional right to marry is the right of an individual and a couple to have their own official family relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that accorded the family relationships of other couples,” wrote Chief Justice Ronald M. George, joined by Justices Joyce L. Kennard, Kathryn Mickle Werdegar and Carlos Moreno.
Ed Whelan‘s post captures a couple of important quotes from the dissenters:
From associate justice Baxter’s dissent (joined by associate justice Chin): “Nothing in our Constitution, express or implicit, compels the majority’s startling conclusion that the age-old understanding of marriage … is no longer valid. California statutes already recognize same-sex unions and grant them all the substantive legal rights this state can bestow. If there is to be a further sea change in the social and legal understanding of marriage itself, that evolution should occur by similar democratic means.
From associate justice Corrigan’s separate dissent: “The principle of judicial restraint is a covenant between judges and the people from whom their power derives.… It is no answer to say that judges can break the covenant so long as they are enlightened or well-meaning.… If there is to be a new understanding of the meaning of marriage in California, it should develop among the people of our state and find its expression at the ballot box.”
I strongly support civil unions and am more or less neutral on the policy question of gay marriage. How society gets there, however, matters a lot.
Democratic Congressman and federal judge Abner Mikva once explained:
I think judges tend to be too separate from the political process and the body politic. I guess the best example I can think of is one of the great controversies of our time, the abortion controversy, Roe v. Wade. Let me start off, so everyone understands my prejudices, I support the result of Roe v. Wade. When I was a member of the state legislature, I was introducing proposals to make Illinois law approximate what Roe v. Wade later on did. That was going on in other legislatures. ...
And then, to my pleasant surprise, the Supreme Court came down with [a decision that] preempted the whole political process. They said, “Okay, as a matter of constitutional law we are going to say a woman has the right to choose, and if she decides that she want to have an abortion, she and her doctor can so decide.” The result pleased a lot of us, still pleases a majority of the people in this country. But it angered that minority with a passion, because they had just been short-circuited in their efforts to fight it out in the political arena. You can’t write a justice of the Supreme Court and say “Vote No.” You can’t even picket at the Supreme Court, though they tried to. There is a frustration that these five or six people, unelected, had made this basic decision which had been the subject of political process for so many years before. The justices were surprised. The late justice Blackman expressed his shock at how angry the minority was with the decision. I could have told him that was going to happen. And in retrospect, I wish the court had stayed its hand and allowed the political process to continue, because we would have legislated the effect of Roe v. Wade in most states—not all of them, but in most states—and we wouldn’t have had to pay the political price we’ve had to pay for it being a court decision. The people who are angry at that court are angry beyond measure. As far as they are concerned the whole system is rotten because they’ve lost their opportunity to slug it out....
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has likewise stated that “Roe v. Wade . . . halted a political process that was moving in a reform direction and thereby, I believe, prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue.”
Hence, Daniel Henninger has argued that the culture wars:
[Date] to the Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision of 1973. ... [T]he country’s judges the past 30 years have made much law touching people’s deepest beliefs about the ordering of public and private life, which previously was the first responsibility of elected legislatures. ... I think many people who don’t get paid for waging politics are becoming quite frustrated with dysfunctional legislatures that are now polarized--as in Congress or in California--essentially along the cultural faultlines created by 30 years of allowing judges to pre-empt the broader community’s ability to discover, or re-examine, its social beliefs. These legislators have become little more than clerks to judges and the complainants in their courts--the law as not much more than a brief. When this happens, citizens lose their status as voters or electors and become mere courtroom spectators. How can this be good?
Today, gay marriage occupies much the same spot in the political field that abortion did in 1973.
Accordingly, I think it’s instructive to compare the NY high court’s decision to leave the issue to the legislature to the judicial activism we saw today from the California Supreme Court. I wrote in praise of the NY court’s decision, explaining that:
Because it is custom, tradition, and long familiar patterns that enable people to live together peaceably, social change needs to come slowly. Change and progress are necessary, of course, but sudden change disrupts social bonds, induces stress and engenders controversy as old and vested interests are upset.
Sudden change by a cabal of unelected and largely unaccountable judges is particularly likely to engender controversy. Again, I’ll let Judge Mikva explain: “I don’t think it’s an accident that our founders put the legislative branch in the first article of the Constitution. The reason is that they perceived it to be the first among equals. Most of the people who’d been in Philadelphia had been members of the colonial legislatures, had been members of the Continental Congress, of the early congresses, and they understood the legislative process. They knew how it worked, and they recognized that there was a direct tie between where the people were and where the legislative branch was. They … were nervous about the judges because the English judges had not been an unmixed blessing as far as the colonies were concerned.”
The founders knew, like Spiderman, that “with great power comes great responsibility.” They ensured that Congress and the President could be held to account. If you don’t like what Congress is doing, you can vote for legislators you like better. You can contribute to candidates all over the country who share your views (of course, your ability to do so is limited because our judges have decided that political campaign contributions deserve less First Amendment protection than, say, child porn). You can give to 527 organizations that will promote your agenda. And so on.
Unfortunately, perhaps because they could not envision the extent to which modern judges would assert control over virtually all aspects of society and culture, the Founders failed to provide adequate accountability mechanisms. If you don’t like what the Supreme Court does, tough. All you can hope is that you can elect leaders who will eventually replace enough of those nine unelected old men and women with individuals whose views are more to your liking.
Abraham Lincoln saw the problem coming. He said of the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision that: “If the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.” And so it is today.
The time is fast approaching when the preservation of democracy will require the creation of new mechanisms for holding judges to account. Term limits might be a good place to start. Until then, however, we must rely on judges to exercise self-restraint. We must hope that judges can tell the difference between cases where intervention is necessary and appropriate, like Brown v. Board of Education, and cases that should remain in the political arena.
So whether you agree with the N.Y. Court or not, they at least deserve our thanks for a rare display of judicial modesty. Now if only we could get those nine oldsters in Washington to emulate their northern counterparts.
"Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has likewise stated that “Roe v. Wade . . . halted a political process that was moving in a reform direction and thereby, I believe, prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue.””
I seem to recall someone (Jesse Helms?) saying a while back that this was the problem with striking down Jim Crow laws in the South. If only Southerners had been left to their own devices they would have come around eventually and repealed such things through the democratic process.
"How society gets there, however, matters a lot.”
The California legislature has twice enacted same-sex marriage, only to have it vetoed by Governor Arnold. Maybe he won’t veto it the third time in light of this decision and if he does, the governor who follows him (probably a Democrat) will sign such a law.
The standard conservative position on such issues hasn’t changed much since Bull Connors’ heyday.
“Rights, boy? You think you have rights? You have rights when I say you do and you’ll have the rights I say you have.”
Fortunately the California court isn’t full of Bulls. America took another big step towards the rational light. After this Election Day, when the few remaining conservatives are huddled in hidden caves trying to figure out why Saint Reagan failed them, steps like this will be happening on a very regular basis.
It’s gonna be great, Stevie.
I tried reading the opinion, but got tired after ten pages or so, so I read the concurring and dissenting opinions instead. I did find it interesting that the majority opinion states:
In considering this question, we note at the outset that the constitutional
issue before us differs in a significant respect from the constitutional issue that has
been addressed by a number of other state supreme courts ... in interpreting the applicable
provisions of their respective state constitutions, to determine the validity of
statutory provisions or common law rules limiting marriage to a union of a man
and a woman. ... These courts, often by a one-vote
margin, have ruled upon the validity of statutory
schemes that contrast with that of California ...
But then this opinion is decided by a one-vote margin. I can’t help but wonder why that reference is in there. It is now impossible to frame a case to get the judges to reconsider that one-vote margin. “I can’t get a marriage license” is a basis for a lawsuit, “I can get a marriage license” or “my neighbor can get a marriage license” is not.
The majority opinion also states
<blockquote>As past cases establish, the substantive right of two adults who share a loving
relationship to join together to establish an officially recognized family of their
own — and, if the couple chooses, to raise children within that family —
constitutes a vitally important attribute of the fundamental interest in liberty and
personal autonomy that the California Constitution secures to all persons for the
benefit of both the individual and society.</blcokquote>
It seems to me that there are several cases where two adults who share a loving relations should be prohibited from marriage. Close relatives are one case, as are people who are currently married to other people and will not get divorced from them. I have a feeling that most laws about who can get a marriage license could be struck down based on this kind of legal reasoning. If the state doesn’t have a compelling interest in same-sex marriages, then how can it have a compelling interest in whether relatives marry or whether people practice bigamy?
Hey obviously homosexuality has been around a long long time, but gay marriage is something NEW. That means you don’t get there by having the courts give it to you, you get there by changing the law. California was well on the way of doing that. Does this help gay marriage if California voters now go back and change the State Constitution to ban gay marriage via a new voter’s referrendum? The proper thing to have done is what Suffergets ultimately did,. They tried court challenges too (under the 14th Amendment) which the courts at the time rightly said was not intended to give women the right to vote. That is how we got the 19th Amendment.
So while I support the outcome but I am absolutely opposed to the means of acheiving it. Deb Saunders nails it with this article: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/05/city_hall_of_love.html
This is not judicial activism. The CA legislature *twice* passed gay-marriage bills, both of which were vetoed by Arnold. Now the court has found in support of the legislature, and Arnold is saying he supports the court’s ruling.
Clearly, this is exactly the process and outcome that Arnold wanted, but why? God only knows.
This is not judicial activism. The CA legislature *twice* passed gay-marriage bills, both of which were vetoed by Arnold. Now the court has found in support of the legislature, and Arnold is saying he supports the court’s ruling.
I don’t follow the logic. In the ‘90s Congress passed several bills to open ANWAR to oil drilling, but Clinton continued to veto those bills so they never became law. If the Supreme Court “found in support of the legislature” and opened ANWAR to drilling would that be judicial activism?
In this case California had a law on the books. The legislature didn’t pass it, the law came from a ballot initiative; which meant that under the Californian Constitution the legislature could not change it. The majority opinion makes it very clear that this law was on the books:
In Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004), this court concluded that public officials of the City and County of San Francisco acted unlawfully by issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in the absence of a judicial determination that the California statutes limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman are unconstitutional.
A dissenting opinion points out that it’s pretty clear that legislative attempts to change it would themselves be unconstitutional:
Under [the California Constitution] article II, section 10, subdivision (c), [the Liegislature] cannot unilaterally repeal an initiative statute, such as Family Code section 308.5, unless the initiative measure itself so
provides. Section 308.5 contains no such provision.
In this case the California Supreme Court determined that a law on the books which the legislature could not directly overturn became unconstitutional because of laws the legislature passed. That’s why a dissenting opinion referred to the result as “legal jujitsu”:
Yet the majority suggests that, by enacting other statutes which do provide substantial rights to gays and lesbians — including domestic partnership rights which, under section 308.5, the Legislature could not call “marriage” — the Legislature has given “explicit official recognition” ... to a California right of equal treatment which, because it includes the right to marry, thereby invalidates section 308.5.
I cannot join this exercise in legal jujitsu, by which the Legislature’s own weight is used against it to create a constitutional right from whole cloth, defeat the People’s will, and invalidate a statute otherwise immune from legislative interference. Though the majority insists otherwise, its pronouncement seriously oversteps the judicial power. The majority purports to apply certain fundamental provisions of the state Constitution, but it runs afoul of another just as fundamental ...
So, yes, I think it’s a case of judicial activism. The court has a PDF of the opinion at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S147999.PDF for anyone interested in making up their own mind.
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I am not passing judgment on whether the right to marry is a fundamental right… but I must question whether the “political arena” is the right or, as implied here, only place to fight about “fundamental rights.” Whether something is a fundamental right as often implicates a minority’s interests, and all too often that minority does not have an adequate voice in the political process. Exhibit A: Jim Crow.
I’m not saying that the courts can be completely disdainful of the political process, or chart a course without reference to anything but personal ideologies. I am only saying that I do not have a strong trust in potential mob rule over something that might (or might not) be a fundamental right. This strikes me as one of those issues that probably should be left to the courts, rather than the legislatures… because if the courts get it too wrong, the polity can amend the relevant constitution. Legislation about fundamental rights, though, is almost always a disaster.