Contra Sullivan on the Surge: A Small Wars Perspective

My take on the Iraq war has been settled for a while: The decision to invade was a huge mistake, but cutting and running would only make things worse. So I’ve been mildly encouraged by the growing evidence of success by the surge and the accompanying political efforts. Here’s Andrew Sullivan’s take or, more precisely, the more cheerful parts of AS’ take:

… the passage of the law allowing for more Sunnis and former Baathists to take part in the national government’s structure is new. It’s a genuine success of the kind we were once promised. It’s the first actual data point that suggests some kind of reconciliation may be possible in Baghdad. ... if there is any indication of national reconciliation, even if it is fleeting and ephemeral and qualified, the argument for sinking more money and time into Iraq will, it seems to me, gain strength.

But then Sullivan makes this rhetorical move:

Since the failure of nerve by the opposition last summer, the US has effectively decided to occupy Iraq for the rest of our lives. We had a choice: ten months or ten years, and by default we picked the latter - and, according to McCain, it’s more like a hundred years. ... Iraq, I suspect, is now America’s for ever - something Iraqis will always resent but never be able to reverse.

This strikes me as unduly pessimistic. What we’re dealing with here is a war of the type the US has often fought:

Unlike its predecessor, it is not a traditional war and is the type of war the US military tried to avoid for years—a counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgencies fall into the category of “small wars,” which also includes peacekeeping, stability and support operations, and humanitarian missions. Also referred to as low-intensity conflict, guerrilla war, irregular war, and “savage wars of peace,” among other names, the term “small war” does not imply the size or intensity of the conflict. Small wars are instead characterized by the asymmetric nature of the conflict, and the political outcome sought, and they typically pit a state against a non-state adversary who does not employ regular forces. Irregular enemies range from terrorist organizations, criminal groups, and militias to warlord armies and insurgent movements. The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual defines small wars as “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as determined by the policy of our nation.” Victory—or more accurately, success—in this type of war is much more difficult to determine. Instead of a clearly defined end-state where one side capitulates, success in these irregular conflicts is measured by the political outcome that results from the intervention.

Small wars are not new to the American military. Yet despite the nation’s long history in this arena, the American success rate in waging small wars is far from stellar, particularly since the end of World War II. Thomas X. Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone, notes “the only kind of war America has lost” is a small war against an irregular foe, citing Vietnam (1975), Lebanon (1983), and Somalia (1993) to support his point.

Yet, it’s precisely that patter of losses I believe we cannot afford to repeat in Iraq:

As an Army brat growing up during the Vietnam War, I saw the damage our strategy of just declaring victory and going home did to Army morale and prestige, to the tone of our national politics and our nation’s standing in the world. Later, we cut and ran from Lebanon. More recently, we cut and ran from Somalia. I have no doubt that this pattern of cutting and running emboldened al-Qaida. We simply cannot afford to cut and run from Iraq, lest our foes be emboldened to new and even more devastating attacks. A global hegemon that keeps running away when the going gets tough will not command any respect.

In sum, even if attacking Iraq was imprudent, we have to stay the course. There could be nothing less prudent than cutting and running. Our permanent national interests now require that we win the peace.

...

Americans know that we’ve fought many wars in which there were times when it looked like we might lose. In most, we stayed the course and eventually came out on top. Only when we cut and ran did we lose.

The good news is that small wars don’t last forever and can be won. To be sure, there have been small wars that resulted in long occupations; The Phillipines and Nicauragua spring to mind. Yet, even so, American policy long has been - as the Marine Corps’ 1940 small wars manual puts it - “small wars will not be conducted with a view to the permanent acquisition of foreign territory.” To the contrary, “eventual withdrawl is certain.”

Sullivan can point to quotations from some politicians to support his argument, but the historical evidence is to the contrary. Where is the evidence that the powerful underlying social, economic, and cultural factors that have defined America’s approach to small wars for two centuries have changed so fundamentally? 

Posted on Sunday, January 13 2008 | Permalink

It’s the first actual data point that suggests some kind of reconciliation may be possible in Baghdad. ...

Yes, the Accountability & Justice Law (de-baathification) is an important milestone, but Sullivan and others just haven’t been paying attention.

The Government of Iraq’s (GOI) agreement to work with and eventually manage the Concerned Local Citizens (neighborhood watches), its funding of official security forces in primarily Sunni areas (Iraqi Police, Provincial Security Forces), its direct distribution of funds to the Sunni provinces without an official hydrocarbons law or a sufficient official budget in 07, and the impending passage of the 08 budget which includes large distribution to Sunni-dominated areas are all signs of reconciliation, or accommodation, as many prefer calling it.

These are all signs, albeit below the bar set by official US benchmarks, that some folks in the GOI are interested in political accommodation.

Posted by Bill from INDC  on  01/14  at  12:58 AM

"Where is the evidence that the powerful underlying social, economic, and cultural factors that have defined America’s approach to small wars for two centuries have changed so fundamentally?”
I can answer that, but first I must state that I support the Iraq War, will continue to support the Iraq war until victory, and did so with three tours in OIF prior to my retirement. 
The one factor that changes America’s approach so fundamentally is the nature of the enemy.  If one accepts that were are currently fighting al Queda forces in Iraq, which I accept, then we are fighting an enemy that for the first time has access to hundred of billions of petrol-dollars in financial support, a potential pool of billions from which to draw fighters, global reach through access to and support of state-sponsors who can supply legitimate passports and cover, and the ability to play the west’s concern for multi-culturalism like a fiddle. 
None of the these conditions existed in any of our previous small wars.  Even the NVA didn’t have access to the types of money and fighters that al Queda has.  Current al Queda fighters and monies come from every corner of the globe, and increasingly from western countries that are themselves the target of al Queda. 
If we were simply fighting JAM or other Iraqi insurgents, then your premise holds.  The fight in Iraq is not much different from the fight in Viet Nam.  Lefties worldwide have deluded themselves to such, in the belief that like Viet Nam, we could successfully walk away from Iraq and never face that enemy again.  However, for the NVA, the conquest over South Vietnamese forces signaled the end of their fight with the US.  I believe history backs me on that assertion.  The idea that we could walk away from Iraq and never face al Queda again, or other aligned islamic fundamentalist forces, is a pipedream.

Posted by  on  01/14  at  01:26 AM

We are still in Germany and Japan 60 years after that war ended. Why does anyone expect to wars to suddenly become quick little 5-year things?

Posted by  on  01/14  at  01:39 AM

There are some energy things on the horizon that could change everything.

Easy Low Cost No Radiation Fusion

WB-7 First Plasma

Posted by M. Simon  on  01/14  at  01:58 AM

We have bases in Iraq and they will be for more than any Lefy can count or live. Even with a Dem as president.

Posted by  on  01/14  at  02:13 AM

McCain’s point is that the war will be over when we quit taking casualties, not when our military presence is withdrawn.  The alternative is to assert that there is an ongoing war in Kuwait, Korea, Japan, Germany, England, and so on.

Posted by  on  01/14  at  02:14 AM

"There are some energy things on the horizon that could change everything.

Easy Low Cost No Radiation Fusion

WB-7 First Plasma
Posted by M. Simon on 01/14 at 01:58 AM”

Not really. Much of the oil money has been turned into investments that will fund Islam’s expansion for as long as required.

There aren’t any easy ways out for us.

Posted by  on  01/14  at  08:37 AM

"Why does anyone expect to wars to suddenly become quick little 5-year things?”

Because that’s how they are on television. Really. The average voter is post WWII, post America at real war, and their only frame of personnal reference is John Wayne/Indiana Jones killing Nazis, which conveniently wrapped itself up in two hours. Or Vietnam, which wrapped itself up in two hours with a consequence-free retreat from Communism and a musical protest song montage. Of course Communism eventually fell anyway fell thanks to Rocky beating Ivan Drago. For the average voter, war, in their lifetime is something that occurs on TV, that good people march against, and that ends with a punctuation, Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan, war’s over, whats on another channel?

Our society, our comforts, our feeling of entitlement, has made us completely unrealistic about, and completely unsuited to fighting a real war.

Posted by  on  01/14  at  10:20 AM

Just to quibble on a couple things.

The Parameters article quotes an author saying we lost the small war in Vietnam in 1975. By the time we pulled out our ground combat units, the Viet Cong were smashed and the North Vietnamese sent south to astroturf the revolution couldn’t make headway in villager allegiance. In 1975, a mechanized North Vietnames regular army invasion blitzed South Vietnam. Nothing small about that.

As for our longer occupations, remember that those occupations generally had nothing to do with the original war but post-war threats. We kept lots of combat troops in Germany to keep the Soviets out and not because we worried about a Nazi revolt. We had but a token ground presence in Italy since a direct attack on Italy was unlikely. And Japan had our Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces for power projection in the region. South Korea has had diminishing ground forces to keep out the North Koreans. And in the Philippines, it was about Clark Air Force Base to project air power and Subic Bay to project naval power. Between the Gulf Wars we maintained a near-constant presence of a combat brigade in Kuwait to deter Iraq.

And we left Philippines when the Philippine government said to go. With the Soviet Union gone, those bases weren’t high priority any more. And we’ve drawn down our troops in South Korea as ROK became capable of holding the ground without our troops. That’s also why Marines can move from Okinawa to Guam. And why our troop strength in Germany has declined so much. Those remaining there and in Germany are for power projection to eastern Europe and Middle East.

In none of those cases were we there to fight insurgents or terrorists after the war was over. The host governments fought--with our low key help--domestic insurgents or terrorists without our troops coming out of their barracks to fight in the field.

Back to the original point of the piece. So a long US presence in Iraq will be no big deal as long as the Iraqi government is strong enough to fight any internal foes. Been there, done that. And if the mullahs ever lose control of Iran, I doubt our combat forces would remain much longer in significant strength in either Iraq or Germany.

Posted by Brian J. Dunn  on  01/14  at  10:54 AM

Just wait long enough and the lefties will be demanding we stay because our (by that point unnecessary presence) provides stability and jobs, etc, etc to the area.

Either Sullivan is a fool or he is intentionally misinterpreting what McCain said to make it appear as if we’ll maintain the same level of warfare for 100 years. Normally Sullivan’s not a fool but on certain issues he’s certainly blind so i don’t know which option applies.

Posted by  on  01/14  at  12:09 PM

"Since the failure of nerve by the opposition last summer, the US has effectively decided to occupy Iraq for the rest of our lives.” Hello there, we’re still in Korea, Germany, Okinawa, etc…

Posted by  on  01/14  at  02:19 PM

A new book shows Saddam did support al Qaeda and the Taliban:

‘Both In One Trench: Saddam’s Secret Terror Documents’

http://www.bothinonetrench.com

Posted by Ray Robison  on  01/14  at  03:25 PM

But not as “occupiers”, i.e., our bases in Germany have nothing to do with pacifying the German population. The only thing close to that is what we have in Korea, and there it’s not to pacify the South Korean population, but to deter an invasion from the North.

Posted by Marty  on  01/14  at  03:29 PM

"The idea that we could walk away from Iraq and never face al Queda again, or other aligned islamic fundamentalist forces, is a pipedream.”

No serious observer, Sullivan included, even attempts to make that argument.  The actual argument is that the invasion of Iraq was a diversion of limited resources from a front where we were actually fighting and beating al Qaeda.  This diversion has led us to squander ever-scarcer resources to barely contain an incipient civil war in the optional invasion, and barely hold on to the foothold in Afghanistan that we won in 2002.

But, you know, why actually present your opponents arguments accurately when you can just smear them with straw-men?

Posted by  on  01/14  at  03:54 PM

Marty, you don’t know much about post-WWII Germany. Here’s a link (just one that was easy for me to find, there are many more: Google is your friend): http://www.deanesmay.com/archives/007029.html

b, No “serious observer” cares what the invasion of Iraq _WAS_. The questions are: What has it become and what can we do about the current circumstances?

Just because it was (arguably) a mistake and diversion of resources doesn’t mean we can leave without repercussions. Assuming we can leave Iraq without consequences and focus an al Qaeda in Afghanistan NOW is not indicative of a “serious observer”. It (arguably) may have been a good idea six years ago; now it is folly.

Posted by mrsizer  on  01/14  at  04:34 PM

If I travel to Florida, but stop at a hotel along the way, one could easily argue that I am not traveling to Florida.

The gestalt argument over Iraq will continually produce failures...and successes.

Are we heading in the right direction?  Absolutely.

Should we fret over a timetable-which by failing to meet-should be interpreted as abject failure?  No. 

I anxiously want our troops to come home, and I agree that it is destroying our military/families via multi-tours, but unless our congress decides that it wants to increase the size and budget of our military, we go to war with the army we have.

Posted by  on  01/14  at  06:06 PM

"The idea that we could walk away from Iraq and never face al Queda again, or other aligned islamic fundamentalist forces, is a pipedream.”

The idea that if we stay in Iraq for years (sacrificing precious lives and billions of $ to somehow achieve some semblance of stability), we will never face al Queda again, or other aligned islamic fundamentalist forces, is also a pipedream.”

Posted by  on  01/14  at  06:32 PM

If you or the Administration could actually specify what objectives can be achieved by the half-assed military presence we have in Iraq, that might help.  At this point, all we’re doing is (barely) staving off a blood bath, you and your cohorts little anecdotes to the contrary.  Then you grab on to these little straws of hope and try to echo-chamber it into “Conventional Wisdom.” The conflict in Iraq is going to happen one way or another--I suspect it would be a lot better if we weren’t caught in the middle of it.  Oh, and we would do well to get some of the folks who made their bed with us and need to get out a safe haven.  How about the US?  I mean, we just needlessly invaded them, didn’t we?

I understand as well as you that this Administration has backed us into a corner of options in Asia Minor, none of which are particularly appealing.  I further understand how this Administration has weakened our own levers of power, and simultaneously strengthened the hands of Iran at perhaps the most inopportune time since the Shah was overthrown.  But the notion that we should stay in Iraq for an extended period of time, with no goals other than--well, what the hell are goals??  Perhaps if you and other Iraq supporters weren’t so quick to 1) change the goals to fit whatever piece of “good news” has come out and 2) try to get away from the notion that we’re just spinning our wheels because a large percentage of the American people are pissed about how badly this Administration has screwed the pooch, maybe, then, just then, we might actually take you at your word.  But the more Bush talks about staying until “victory” is achieved, the more I’m likely to tune out both him (did that years ago, actually, when we didn’t find any WMD--remember that quaint little pretext?) and his apologists.

Posted by  on  01/14  at  09:17 PM

If a Liberation invasion is a mistake even after 16 UNSC resolutions have been consistently violated, that implies military liberation is always a mistake, doesn’t it?

After Blix could not document that Saddam did not have WMDs, I supported the invasion—and now do not worry about Saddam getting nukes.  Had we not invaded, it seems likely that Iraq and Iran, like India & Pakistan, would both be further along on getting nukes, if not already there.

Iraq victory includes both a functioning democracy, with votes that change the executive, and a close to Wash DC level of violence.  Which is how much, do you not know?

Richard W—great TV answer, which I think is true in the “feelings” of people, even if it is missed if they are asked a specific question.

Is democracy in Iraq no improvement over Saddam?  I think it IS improvement.
If it is improvement, how much is the benefit worth?—how few Americans would have had to die for you to think Op Iraqi Freedom was NOT a mistake?  I’ve NEVER seen any anti-Iraq invasion skeptic answer this.

Posted by Tom Grey  on  01/14  at  11:18 PM

Prof.Bainbridge,
Great Post - thanks , we need some blogs that are unapologetically happy about the success of the surge. Happy not just for the courage and hard work of the US Armed Forces but also for the Iraqis who finally stepped up to the plate in such a courageous way - remember they have had to suffer so much more than what any one wants to acknowledge and they had so much more to lose. If by some chance the US troops were forced to leave early by a Congressional vote, the Iraqis would have still faced the daily challenges that they face today.

Please do not take Andrew Sullivan too seriously - he has completely lost it when it comes to Iraq - notice how he finally veers to how Obama would be the most “pragmatic” about the war.

For some one who thinks that the Sunnis joined forces with the US because they were afraid that the Dems winning the 06 elections would leave them “vulnerable” to the Shias, Obama is indeed ..ahem.. pragmatic.

Sullivan is slowly starting to realize that no matter how badly this war has been mismanaged the US and the Iraqis are now making progress and the Govt is not going to drawdown significant number of troops any time soon. Unfortunately for Sullivan’s dream candidate that is A HUGE PROBLEM especially if McCain wins the GOP nomination. Hence the negativity from Sullivan.

If you are a fairweather supporter of the war who has given up on it like Andrew Sullivan has, what else can you do other than insinuate how
“an Arab Muslim country” can never be a democracy.?

Posted by  on  01/15  at  12:02 AM

"If you or the Administration could actually specify what objectives can be achieved by the half-assed military presence we have in Iraq, that might help.”

It is a debate I have with my conscious, often.

Good outcome v. bad outcome.

If you cannot find ‘what objectives can be achieved’ with minimal thought though, your mind is closed.  What a surprise.

Even a skeptic should be able to provide reams of possibilites inconsistent with their view-I don’t know how you can reconcile ‘half-assed military presense’ with the absolute success of anbar. 

The glass is 2/3 full, or 1/3 empty.  Take your pick.

Posted by  on  01/15  at  01:17 AM

Forget wmds…

Saddam was a major player in terrorism.

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/04/03/world/main505316.shtml

The title?
“Salaries For Suicide Bombers”
An excerpt?
“Since Iraq upped its payments last month, 12 suicide bombers have successfully struck inside Israel, including one man who killed 25 Israelis, many of them elderly, as they sat down to a meal at a hotel to celebrate the Jewish holiday of Passover. The families of three suicide bombers said they have recently received payments of $25,000.”

Two of the biggest myths out there-
Saddam was ‘contained’ and he was ‘not involved in terrorism’.

Posted by  on  01/15  at  04:13 AM

Where is the evidence that the powerful underlying social, economic, and cultural factors that have defined America’s approach to small wars for two centuries have changed so fundamentally?

It’s called oil. If it weren’t for oil, we wouldn’t give a rat’s ass about the Middle East anyway. Yeah, we would probably still support Israel, but the threat against them would be much lower because the Arab states wouldn’t have all that free cash flow to fund the opposition.

But because of oil, any ME conflict has the potential to go apocalyptic, which sadly seems to be the desire of some on the far right anyway.

Posted by Derek Scruggs  on  01/15  at  01:09 PM

Interesting post and debate in the comments. Iraq War opponents rarely provide an honest assessment of Bush’s options after 9/11. Afghanistan is by far the most difficult project. The logistics are a nightmare, especially if Mushareff loses his job. The country is dirt poor and has no recent tradition of a middle class. There was once a university in Kabul but the countryside is unchanged from the time Alexander fought there. Iraq had the best potential of any Arab country to make it into the modern age. It had a middle class. it had oil wealth that could be used to rebuild the country and Saddam had trashed so much of the traditional Arab society that a new order seemed possible. If Iraq can’t make it, no Arab country can rule itself without tyrants.

The Army was not interested in COIN war tactics but that was the war we had. The Army chose to keep the Sherman tank for the Normandy invasion when the M 26 Pershing tank was available. The result was 600% casualties in the tank units. The Army has made many mistakes. The Marine were training for an urban insurgency war for the past ten years. That’s why they did so much better in the first three years than the Army. This is the war we will have for the next half century if we’re lucky. Yes, we need a bigger Army and, fortunately, we have the cadre to build it upon.

President Obama is going to find his options limited next January.

Posted by Michael Kennedy  on  01/15  at  06:00 PM
Commenting is not available in this weblog entry.

Introduction


Recent Punditry Entries


Hot Topics on Food & Wine

Hot Topics on Law & Business


Punditry RSS Feed

Flickr

Archives

My Books



Blogroll